I was looking at the new smart contracts submitted list on Etherscan to pass the afternoon, and I came across this one:


The contract seems to be a simple game of Q&A, but I noticed the original answer could be seen in plain sight here:


The answer reads "A phonE", and I thought it would get stolen quickly, since I can't be the only one doing this. I decided to take it, contact the owner, and return it to safety. I made some tests on the TestNet to see if everything worked (you need to send 1 ETH to submit a message), and it went fine. This is the testing contract address, you can check the transactions to see the process I was going to follow:


As you can see, everything went fine, so I decided to do it on the MainNet. However, even though the messages and all are correct, it ate my ETH and nothing happened. I have accepted the loss of the Ether, but I am wondering, why would it not work, even tho it did on the TestNet?

2 Answers 2


I wrote a blog post to relate your misadventure in more detail. Here is what happened:

  • Using their first account, they deployed a HiddenQuestionSender contract, which passes through commands, with this transaction.
  • 12 days later, using their second account, they deploy their X_GAME contract with this transaction.
  • Right after that, using their first account, they tell HiddenQuestionSender to set up the question, StartGame with 0 Ether, and change the hash, NewQuestion, with this transaction. In the call data, you can see the question but not the answer; but it doesn’t matter in the end. You can also find the new fake hash: 0xaee11ed86334ac3afdac440921f36b90a937dfbc02f43b02a81b763b769fca4a.
  • Right after that again, using their second account, they call StartGame with 1.03 Ether with this transaction. Notice the TxReceipt Status: Success.
  • Later, you tried your luck with this transaction and 1.01 Ether. You lost it to the contract.
  • At some point, they collected their rewards, with this transaction, which is also listed in the internal transactions of X_GAME. It’s the only one there, and is too late to alert you.

For others reading this, it would have been possible to detect something fishy earlier with web3.eth.getStorageAt(X_GAME.address, slotIndex) and:

  • At slot 1, find out that questionSender is not their address but strangely that of a smart contract: HiddenQuestionSender
  • At slot 2, find out that responseHash does not match web3.sha3(“A phonE”)

You could also have used Ganache to --fork from the main net and safely test the outcome of your own attack.

  • Bless you my man. This should be made public knowledge. Jul 4, 2018 at 15:56

Sorry you fell for this!

NewQuestion was called before you attempted to take the ether.

I believe this is the transaction that did it: https://www.etherchain.org/tx/f1df0e4113cdd8e864235ff2bbd472c98703794ae10e923cd51c8aea260f102a/parityTrace. Search for 0x3e3ee859, which is the function selector for NewQuestion(string,bytes32).

  • 1
    Ah, thank you. I'll remove that bit from the answer.
    – user19510
    Jun 29, 2018 at 1:49
  • Is that present on Etherscan? If not, that's a bug that would need to be fixed Jun 29, 2018 at 6:42
  • Sure, etherscan.io/….
    – user19510
    Jun 29, 2018 at 6:43
  • The honeypot takes advantage of the fact that Etherscan doesn't list all passed messages in "internal transactions." I think the specific limitation here is that messages with 0 ether attached aren't listed.
    – user19510
    Jun 29, 2018 at 6:44
  • Oh man, I didn't know that. I supposed the smart contract thaat received my ETH had something to do. Shouldn't that be fixed on Etherscan's end? Jun 29, 2018 at 6:48

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