Could parasite contracts cripple the Ethereum ecosystem?

Question

This critique of Ethereum presents leeching Parasite Contracts as a problem. A Parasite Contract accesses data from other contracts (which may be charging fees for the data), and offers the same data for free.

It extends the argument to claim that ultimately all contracts will fail.

Because of this, any Host (external-data contract) can’t grow to a significant size without being invaded by Parasites and leeched to death

While the basic premise may be valid, what are the main reasons why the extended conclusion might be wrong?

Answer 1

Assuming that the premise is valid (which I don't believe it is), the main reason why the extended conclusion is wrong is that this is a slippery slope fallacy: https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com/slippery-slope

Specifically, the author states:

Ethereum allows anyone to make a smart contract about anything. In other words, it has no ability to move intelligently along the autonomy-coordination tradeoff. The autonomy it provides will actually prevent many things from taking place.

Followed by

The Parasite Contract

Behold this outline for a Smart Contract:

1. Offer all the functionality of a pre-determined “Host” Oracle Contract.
2. Wait for the Oracle to report. In other words:
   1. Access the database of the Host’s blockchain (by tracking things like block number, block date, SPV proofs, etc).
   2. Scan the database for anything perfectly-correlated to the External Data fetched by the Host Oracle (contract state, payouts to certain addresses).
3. Use that Host-Data to alter the Parasite’s state (without paying the Host anything).

Because of this, any Host (external-data contract) can’t grow to a significant size without being invaded by Parasites and leeched to death...

Instead of engaging with specifics of the problem the author has jumped to extreme hypotheticals and no proof is presented to show that such extreme hypotheticals will actually occur.

The reason this fictitious 'parasite contract' would never work is because compute resources require Gas. Gas is applied outside of the context of running the transaction. You can't just "Use that Host-Data to alter the Parasite’s state (without paying the Host anything)". The host is earning the gas.

Answer 2

I'm not convinced that the premise is sound. Data provided by any "oracle" vulnerable to that sort of parasite attack would just as easily be accessible to potential customers using the same methods. The point being that it is not an architecture that could be used for a commercial oracle in the first place.

Just because data is publicly accessible does not mean it's publicly readable: while I haven't spent any real effort thinking about how a commercial oracle might work mechanically, it seems to me that published data would most likely be encrypted in such a way as to only be readable by subscribers.