Mind the payment-channel case:

  • Parties A and B lock the state of their balances, S0, on the blockchain.

  • A makes a transaction by updating the state to S1, signing it and sending to B.

  • B makes a transaction by updating the state to S2, signing it and sending to A.

That can go on and on indefinitely. Now, suppose, instead of payment-channel, we're trying to implement a chess game off-chain. They bet $50 on the outcome.

  • Players A, B init a new game on the blockchain and lock the board state, S.

  • Player A performs a move by updating the board state to S1, signing it, sending to B.

  • Player B checks A's move was valid, performs a transaction the same way.

That, again, goes on for a while. As soon, though, as A performs a move that is clearly advantageous to him - say, capturing B's queen - B will just not sign anything on top of A's move, forcing him to continue on the blockchain.

Does that mean that state-channels only work for transactions that affect the sender negatively?

  • Of course there are cases when B will stop playing fairly, but what benefit does he get from this? He'll lose his money either way Commented Jan 26, 2017 at 21:05

1 Answer 1


In general any situation where one side has nothing to lose by misbehaving can be fixed by making them put up a bond against misbehviour, provided that misbehaviour is detectable and can be proved to the smart contract. That would work in your example.

The need for a bond may reduce the attractiveness of playing, however.

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